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Abstract—The provision of reserves in power systems is of great 
importance in what concerns keeping an adequate and 
acceptable level of security and reliability. This need for reserves 
and the way they are defined and dispatched gain increasing 
importance in the present and future context of smart grids and 
electricity markets due to their inherent competitive environ-
ment. This paper concerns a methodology proposed by the 
authors, which aims to jointly and optimally dispatch both 
generation and demand response resources to provide the 
amounts of reserve required for the system operation. Virtual 
Power Players are especially important for the aggregation of 
small size demand response and generation resources. The 
proposed methodology has been implemented in MASCEM, a 
multi agent system also developed at the authors’ research 
center for the simulation of electricity markets. 
Index Terms—Ancillary services, demand response, joint market 
simulation, multi agent systems, virtual power player. 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
Several recent environmental and energetic concerns 
implemented through energy policies have caused an increase 
in the use of renewable energies based electricity generation. 
The generation units associated with those renewable energies 
are of small size, geographically dispersed, and usually 
referred as Distributed Generation (DG) [1].  
The increasing integration of distributed generation at 
lower levels of power networks, namely at the level of 
distribution networks, has led to the implementation of the 
Smart Grid (SG) concept, which is being also associated with 
the use of Demand Response (DR) [2, 3].  
Another important change in the operation and planning of 
power systems is the implementation of electricity markets. 
These competitive environments represent an opportunity for 
all the involved players to increase their and the whole system 
economic efficiency [4]. 
All the resources of all sizes, including the distributed 
generation and demand response, can participate directly in 
the electricity market in case of adequate resource size. For the 
resources of small size, not able to directly participate in the 
electricity market due to their physical characteristics but also 
to their reduced strategic capacity, Virtual Power Players 
(VPPs) assume a very relevant role enabling their participation 
in the electricity market [5]. These players aggregate both 
generation and consumption (including demand response and 
electric vehicles) resources [6]. 
In order to maintain increased levels of security required in 
the smart grid context, system reserves must give adequate 
attention to the intermittence and unpredictability of 
distributed generation and demand response resources 
availability.  
The dispatch of resources providing energy and system 
reserves can be done in a joint or separate way. Focusing in 
the joint dispatch of energy and reserve, which is addressed in 
the present paper, the late and most relevant works, also 
including demand response resources, are presented in [7]-[9]. 
The methodology proposed in the present paper addresses 
the integration of the joint dispatch of energy and reserve in 
MASCEM [10, 11] simulator. Both DG and DR small size 
resources and consumers are able to be aggregated by one or 
several VPPs which participate in the market resources 
dispatch. The large size resources (generation, DR, and 
consumers) can participate directly in the dispatch as buyers 
(in the case of consumers and of consumption aggregators) or 
sellers (in the case of generators). The resources dispatch is 
formulated as an optimization problem which aims to 
minimize the operation costs. The model also considers the 
specified demand and reserve energy needs.  
As referred, the proposed energy and Ancillary Services 
(AS) joint market model is incorporated into the MASCEM 
simulator. This integration provides the means for validating 
the proposed model through simulations based on real 
electricity markets’ data in a well established and proof-given 
electricity market simulator. The MASCEM simulator is 
constantly under development and expansion since 2003 [10]. 
Throughout these years, MASCEM’s model has 
accommodated a large number of different players and of 
electricity market types, using models from several countries. 
These include day-ahead models, forward contracts, balancing 
markets, complex markets and bilateral contracts. The 
integration of the energy and AS joint market also comes to 
expand the MASCEM capabilities in simulating as many 
market models extending the simulator functions. 
The structure of the paper, after this introduction section, is 
as follows: Section III presents an overview of the MASCEM 
simulator, including the addition of the energy and AS joint 
market model in this simulator; Section IV presents the 
computational implementation of the problem, detailing the 
specificities of the proposed energy and reserve joint market; 
Section V illustrates the application of the proposed approach 
in a demonstrative case study; finally, Section VI exposes the 
most important conclusions of the work. 
III. ANCILLARY SERVICES IN MASCEM 
MASCEM [10, 11] is a simulator which aims to facilitate 
the study of complex electricity markets. Figure 1 presents the 
global structure of MASCEM, where consumers (C), 
producers (P), energy storage systems (St), electric vehicles 
(V2G) and VPPs are the players supported by MASCEM. 
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Figure 1.  MASCEM's global structure [13]. 
MASCEM considers the main entities that are part of those 
markets, such as market players and operators, and intends to 
enable the simulation of the largest possible number of market 
models and types of players. Players can act in forward, day-
ahead (symmetric and asymmetric) and balancing markets, 
considering both simple and complex bids. To guarantee 
competitive advantage in the market, players are also provided 
with bidding strategies [11], allowing them to achieve the best 
possible results in the market. MASCEM includes a market 
operator agent, an independent system operator agent (ISO), a 
market facilitator agent, buyer agents, seller agents, Virtual 
Power Player (VPP) [12] agents, and VPP facilitators. 
The market operator validates and analyses the buyer and 
seller agents' bids according to the type of negotiation; it 
determines the market price, and the accepted and refused 
bids. The ISO is responsible for the system's security and for 
ensuring that all conditions are complied within the system. 
To do so, after being informed of all negotiations to be held, it 
examines the technical feasibility from the power system point 
of view and solves congestion problems that may arise. 
The market facilitator knows all the market players, their 
roles and services, since they are registered in advance, and 
regulates all existing negotiations, coordinating and ensuring 
the proper operation of the market. 
The key elements of the market are buyer and seller 
agents. The first ones may comprise for instance consumers 
and distribution companies, while the second ones may 
comprise electricity producers or other entities able to sell 
energy in the market. 
Small independent players, such as small producers, 
mainly based on distributed generation and renewable sources, 
or consumers, need to make alliances between them in order 
to be able to compete in the market equally with big 
companies. These alliances are represented by VPPs [12, 14], 
which provide the adequate means to their aggregates, 
managing their information, and are seen from the market's 
standpoint as common buyers or seller agents. VPPs are 
modelled as a coalition of agents, allowing installing agents on 
separate machines, maintaining high computational perfor-
mance. Such independence is achieved using VPP facilitators 
[12], which manage the communications between VPPs and 
their members independently from the rest of the simulation. 
VPPs send their bids to the MASCEM facilitator to participate 
in the electricity market. 
MASCEM allows the simulation of the following markets: 
day-ahead pool (asymmetric or symmetric, with or without 
complex conditions), bilateral contracts, balancing market, 
forward markets and AS. The user determines for each agent 
whether to, and how to, participate in each market type. By 
selecting a combination of the market models mentioned 
above, hybrid simulations are also allowed. 
The AS negotiation models implemented in MASCEM 
consider the most usual AS in a market environment 
(Regulation Down, Regulation Up, Spinning and Non-
Spinning Reserve). Moreover, a simultaneous approach of 
energy and AS is considered in MASCEM [15]. 
The continuous development of the energy and AS joint 
market simulation model includes some differences in the 
market operation when compared to traditional AS models 
available in MASCEM. The main difference between the 
models lies in the agents bids. In the joint model, bids 
comprise simultaneously the energy and the ancillary services, 
as well as a global maximum limit of energy generation, 
which is independent from the maximum limits for each 
individual service. Thus, the model may allow greater benefits 
in operation costs from the ISO standpoint [15]. 
In addition to this model, this work includes the VPP 
dynamics in submitting bids to purchase and sell energy, 
including what concerns the sales in the reserve market. The 
energy and reserve bids of the large size sellers are also 
included. Furthermore, the model considers bids to purchase 
energy by retailers (buyers). In section IV all constraints and 
assumptions of the proposed methodology are detailed. 
IV. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
The proposed energy and reserve joint market can be 
modeled as an optimization problem that aims to minimize the 
operation costs in the market operator standpoint. The 
complexity of the proposed model leads to the formulation of 
a mixed-integer non-linear problem. The proposed 
optimization problem has been computationally implemented 
and solved in GAMS optimization tool [16]. 
In the proposed joint energy and reserve dispatch, which 
has been adapted from [9], the market operator receives bids 
from electricity buyers, electricity sellers, and VPPs for the 
provision of both energy and reserve requirements. VPPs can 
participate as a seller and/or as a buyer since these players can 
aggregate both generation and demand response resources, as 
well as consumption requirements. The objective function of 
the optimization problem, presented in equation (1) for each 
single period, considers the referred bids received from the 
players (buyers, sellers, and VPPs) for energy and reserve 
provision. The probability of using the reserve and the cost 
related to the non-contracted load shed are also included.  
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The amount of energy provided by the VPP in the market 
is constrained by its minimum and maximum limits for energy 
and reserve products. Furthermore, the total amount of energy 
available for both products is constrained by the VPP bid. 
Equations (2) and (3) represent the minimum limit of 
energy that a VPP can deliver to the market for energy and 
reserve products respectively. Equations (4) and (5) represent 
the maximum limit of energy that a VPP can deliver to the 
market, for energy and reserve products respectively. Equation 
(6) concerns the total energy delivered in each period by the 
VPP. The sum of energy and reserve products quantities must 
respect the maximum limit imposed by equation (6). 
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The conditions imposed by equations (2) to (6) must be 
applied in the same way to each one of the considered large 
size sellers that participates in the market. In this way, each 
seller may submit bids for energy and reserve product 
respecting the referred constraints, which have been included 
in the model, but not detailed in this paper. 
The binary variables used in these equations refer to the 
power dispatched for energy and reserve products. These 
variables are considered equal to 1 when a given player 
capacity is actually dispatched. Equations (12) and (13) 
regard, respectively, the minimum and maximum limits of the 
demand bids, i.e., the minimum and maximum power that can 
be dispatched for a specific player (VPP and/or buyer). In this 
way, the buyers share the same constraints used for the VPPs. 
Thus, equations (12) and (13) fit into the model applied to the 
buyers. 
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In what concerns the balance equations of the problem, 
two distinct equations have been defined – one for energy (16) 
and another for reserve (17).  The energy balance constraint, 
defined in equation (16), considers the VPPs and sellers bids 
for the energy product, and the VPPs and buyers demand bids 
to purchase energy. The reserve balance constraint, defined in 
equation (17), relates the power dispatched by each VPPs and 
sellers to fulfill the reserve requirement imposed by the system 
operator. 
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V. CASE STUDY 
A case study which illustrates the implementation of the 
proposed methodology is presented in this section. The 
relevant information to the characterization of the problem is 
presented in Sub-section A. The results of the presented 
methodology are described in Sub-section B. 
A. Case Characterization 
The developed case study is based on a set of information 
of buying and selling bids to the energy and reserve joint 
market. The present case study regards a scenario developed 
for 24 single periods of one hour representing one day. The 
input data used in this case study have been adapted from the 
case study presented in [9] and it includes information related 
to a set of VPPs, and large size sellers and buyers. In what 
concerns the sellers information (both VPPs and large size 
sellers), the required data is presented in Table I. This includes 
information concerning the type of entity, the minimum and 
maximum global bid limit and global bid price for energy and 
reserve product (for each period, the minimum and maximum 
bid limits and prices vary according to the features of the 
entity) and the total capacity.  
Several VPPs for supply energy and reserve are classified 
in accordance with the type of technology of its main 
resources (Photovoltaic, Combined Heat and Power – CHP, 
fuel cell, small hydro, wind, biomass and Municipal Solid 
Waste – MSW). In this way, there is a significant range of 
VPPs in which the predominant technology in its internal 
management is quite diversified from each other. In addition, 
there are two aggregators, classified as Curtailment Service 
Providers (CSP), which are entities able and dedicated to 
aggregate small size demand response resources. CSPs, 
similarly to VPPs, are able to participate in both energy and 
reserve market products. Five large size sellers are also 
considered in this scenario, with different power and price 
bids, able to participate in energy and reserve services. 
From the buyers’ perspective, the required information is 
presented in Table II. This table comprises similar information 
of the one presented in Table I, yet this time for three demand 
VPPs which only purchase energy, and one large size buyer. 
 
TABLE I.  SELLERS CHARACTERIZATION 
Entities 
Main 
technology 
Minimum capacity (kW) Maximum capacity (kW) Total 
capacity 
(kW) 
Minimum bid price (m.u./kWh) Maximum bid price (m.u./kWh) 
Energy Reserve Energy Reserve Energy Reserve Energy Reserve 
VPP1 Photovoltaic - - 352 150 502 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.21 
VPP2 CHP 7 3 868 372 1240 0.022 0.24 0.022 0.24 
VPP3 Fuel cell 7 3 165 70 235 0.1 0.11 0.1 0.11 
VPP4 Hydro 21 9 49 21 70 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 
VPP5 Wind 46 20 171 74 245 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 
VPP6 Biomass 70 30 245 105 350 0.027 0.029 0.027 0.029 
VPP7 MSW 7 3 7 3 10 0.028 0.033 0.061 0.062 
Seller1 - - - 1275 225 1500 0.18 0.20 0.28 0.30 
Seller2 - - - 1105 195 1300 0.19 0.24 0.26 0.29 
Seller3 - - - 1190 210 1400 0.18 0.20 0.33 0.35 
Seller4 - - - 1785 315 2100 0.21 0.15 0.29 0.17 
Seller5 - - - 1062 188 1250 0.22 0.18 0.31 0.24 
CSP1 - 11 5 759 505 1265 0.16 0.15 0.29 0.24 
CSP2 - 5 2 241 161 402 0.23 0.15 0.38 0.18 
 
TABLE II.  BUYERS CHARACTERIZATION 
Entities 
Minimum 
capacity (kW) 
Maximum 
capacity (kW) 
Energy (m.u./kWh) 
VPP8 - 675 0.42 
VPP9 - 669 0.41 
VPP10 - 315 0.40 
Buyer1 3865 5102 0.45 
 
The demand requirements have been defined for the 24 
hours using the data presented in [17]. The base scenario 
considers a reserve requirement defined in 1000 kWh, in each 
period. The probability of using the reserve can vary between 
0 and 1. 
 
B. Results 
The present sub-section presents the results of the 
application of the proposed methodology to the scenario 
detailed in the previous sub-section. The results obtained 
through the energy and reserve joint market simulation depend 
on the required reserve amount, on the probability of using the 
reserve, as well as on the variation of the resources prices that 
participate in the market. Regarding the probability of using 
the reserve, the market has been simulated according to the 
use of the reserve range between 0 and 1 with step 0.25. In 
order to evaluate the impact of the bids prices, a variation of 
this parameter value in the base scenario defined in sub-
section A has been applied, only for large size sellers which 
are the players with higher influence in the results. A linear 
variation between 0.4 and 2, with step of 0.2 was simulated. In 
this simulation context, the graphs presented below were 
carefully selected to present all results obtained for this case 
study. Figure 2 shows the overall dispatch of all resources 
participating in the market. In Figure 2 it is presented the 
generation of all resources for both energy and reserve 
services. Regarding the required reserve amount, two distinct 
probabilities of using reserve are presented (0.5 corresponding 
to a) part of Figure 2 and 0.75 to b) part). The price variation 
of large size sellers was established in 0.6, 1.0 and 1.2. 
Moreover, Figure 2 illustrates the VPP buyer’s results. The 
total costs that these VPPs acquire in the market for buying 
bids are presented in Figure 2. Through this figure, it can be 
concluded that the amount of energy dispatched by CSPs 
varies considerably with the prices of large size sellers bids. 
Thus, the share of CSPs in the dispatch is higher when the bid 
price of large size sellers is higher. Additionally, Figure 2 
includes the Operation Costs (OC) related to each player (or 
set of players).  
 
Figure 2.  Operation costs and dispatched energy for both energy and 
reserve, for each player or set of players. 
The energy dispatch for the 24-hour period is presented in 
Figure 3. In order to show these results it was considered the 
price step of the large size sellers equal to 1.0. These results 
are related to a probability of using the reserve equal to 0.5.  
 
Figure 3.  Operation costs and dispatched energy related to the energy 
product, for the 24 periods of the day. 
The daily load profile diagram shows the sharing that 
VPPs and groups of large sizes sellers have in the energy 
product provision. In Figure 3 it is possible to see a 
considerable variation of the different resources over the 
simulation periods. This results in different bid limits that each 
resource offers in each period. In period 5, it seems that CSP 
resources do not contribute to the dispatch and VPPs 
contribute a little, while sellers are the main contributors. This 
is due to sellers’ price being cheaper compared to other 
resources. On average, the large size sellers provide about 
72.6% of the demand, while VPPs achieve 15.3% and CSPs 
contribute with the remaining 12.1%.  
In what concerns the reserve dispatch, Figure 4 illustrates 
the share that each group of players has in the dispatch. These 
results (Figure 4) refer to the probability of using reserve 
established at 0.5, for the 24 periods of the day. Throughout 
the simulation periods, the VPPs group is the one which 
contributes more to the reserve (about 60.4%). This is due to 
the bid prices of the majority of the VPPs being the most 
competitive. The large size sellers contribute on average about 
22.9%, followed by CSPs with about 16.7%. In some periods 
the sellers share is null (e.g. period 2), while in other periods 
the CSP share is null (e.g. period 24). This happens due to 
supply capacity and bid price in period to period vary 
substantially. 
 
Figure 4.  Operation costs and dispatched energy related to the reserve 
product, for the 24 periods of the day. 
The visual aspect of the illustrations presented in all the 
figures in this case study corresponds to the visualization of 
the results provided by MASCEM simulator.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Electricity markets with deep economic efficiency 
concerns must accommodate all the available resources and 
involved players in a competitive environment. Some of the 
emerging resources, many of them of small size, require 
specific considerations when being accommodated in the 
electricity market. This requires the resource aggregation, 
which can be done by VPPs that are able to make small 
resources profitable. Those emerging resources include 
distributed generation and demand response resources which 
are of difficulty predictability. So, they require an adequate 
integration in the electricity market. Resources of higher size 
can participate directly in the market. The present paper 
presents the integration of the joint dispatch of energy and 
reserve in MASCEM simulator. The resources dispatch 
minimizes the total operation costs resulting from the use of 
those resources based on the bids submitted by both 
generation and demand resources, for both energy and reserve 
products in the market. The integration of the proposed 
dispatch methodology in MASCEM results in an important 
tool to be used by buyers, sellers, VPPs, and market operators 
in order to improve their performance in the context of the 
electricity market. 
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